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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiff/Appellee Mr. Nguyen filed his Notice of Appeal on August 26,2008. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 
4, Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment of plaintiffs' causes 
of action, when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs' claims, 
established genuine issues of material fact for jury resolution? 
2. Did the trial court err in precluding testimony from plaintiffs expert 
witness, John Goldenring, M.D., when sufficient foundation was laid for him to establish 
standards of care applicable to defendants' agents, their breaches of standard care, their 
failure to obtain informed consent, and the cause of Derek Nguyen's death? 
3. After the trial court excluded Dr. Goldenring, did it also err in entering 
summary judgment on plaintiffs negligence and lack of informed consent causes of action, 
when some of plaintiff s claims are established by evidence independent of Dr. Goldenring's 
testimony and which is amenable to lay understanding? 
4. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment against plaintiffs 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when defendants' agents used Derek 
Nguyen, without his father's permission and contrary to hospital rules, to test a sales-model 
ventilator, the ventilator failed, and, as a result, Derek died? 
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5. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment against plaintiffs 
claim for punitive damages against defendant Primary Children's Medical Center, when its 
agents used Derek, without his father's permission and contrary to hospital rules, to test a 
sales-model ventilator, the ventilator failed, and, as a result, Derek died? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 are questions of law. The appellate court reviews 
entry of summary judgment for correctness, views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and accords no 
deference to the trial court's ruling. Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 
2008 UTApp 315, f 11. 
Issue no. 2 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ^8. 
The issues were preserved for appeal as follows: Issue no. 1 at R. 1400,1597, 
and 3060; Issue no. 2 at R. 1195, Issue no. 3 at R. 3060, Issue no. 4 at R. 1400; and Issue no. 
5 at R. 1597. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
One-year-old Derek Nguyen died when defendants' agents, contrary to the 
rules of Primary Children's Medical Center and without parental consent, attached Derek to 
an untested, sales-model ventilator, it malfunctioned, and he died. Derek's father, the 
plaintiff, sued for negligence, lack of informed consent, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and punitive damages. 
Prior to the trial scheduled August 19-27,2008, defendants moved for partial 
summary judgment of plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
punitive damages, which the court granted at hearing on July 23,2008. R. 3400, pp. 72:18-
23, 84:11-14. Defendants also moved to preclude plaintiffs medical expert, John 
Goldenring, M.D., from testifying at trial, and the court granted that motion in ruling on July 
29,2008. R. 2589-2597. Two days later, July 31,2008 the defendants moved for summary 
judgment of plaintiffs' remaining claims for negligence and lack of informed consent, 
asserting that without testimony from plaintiffs medical expert, these claims could not be 
maintained. R. 3531, pp. 4:8-6:23; R. 521. The court granted that motion and dismissed the 
entire case at hearing on August 1, 2008. R. 3531, 13:17-14:1. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Conduct of Defendants' Agents Resulting in Derek's Death 
1. One-year-old Derek Nguyen suffocated and died when defendants' 
agents attached him, without his father's permission, to an untested, sales-model ventilator, 
which Primary Children's Medical Center ("the hospital") was considering for purchase, and 
it malfunctioned. R. 3514-15,92:4-98:7; R. 1246-48,103:7-113:10, R. 1263,109:17-23; R. 
1272,42:7-14. 
2. Derek was in the pediatric intensive care unit at the hospital as a result 
of severe injuries suffered in a car accident in which his mother was killed. R. 3501, 37:2-
12. 
3. The sales-model was being considered for purchase as a life-flight 
transport ventilator, and was in the hospital for testing and evaluation purposes only, not for 
patient care. R. 1263, 109:17-231272,42:7-14. 
4. No life-flight ventilator had ever been used for patient care in the 
hospital and the new ventilator, once purchased, would not be used in the hospital. R. 1235-
36,44:1-45:3. 
5. Defendants' agents were subject to rules governing use of the sales 
model while it was in the hospital, including that they were not to use it on any critically-ill 
or medically-unstable child; also, that parental approval would have to be obtained before 
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using it on a child. R. 1262, 86:15-87:7; R. 1277, 58:7-17; R. 1331-32, 131:17-132:4; R. 
1367-68, 121:13-123:1, R. 1291-93,75:17-77:14.. 
6. Derek was critically ill and medically unstable, and defendants' agents 
did not obtain the consent of Derek's father to attach him to the sales-model ventilator. R. 
1264, 120:9-121:7; R. 3514, 92:4-17;R. 1277, 58:11-17; R. 3502-03, 44:21-45:8; R.1288, 
71:21-25. 
7. Earlier in the same day that defendants' agents attached Derek to the 
sales model, it was scheduled for testing in the hospital's pediatric intensive care unit 
("PICU"). R. 1272, 41:16-42:14, R. 1243,85:14-87:14. 
8. At the time of the scheduled testing, defendants' agents were unable to 
test the sales model on moderately-ill, stable children, since there were either no such 
children available to serve as test subjects, or because parts were missing for a competitor's 
model that was to be compared in testing against the sales model. R. 1243, 85:14-86:2; R. 
1271,39:2-18. 
9. Defendants' agents that decided to use the sales model on Derek 
included Tammy Bleak, a life-flight nurse and chairperson of the committee assigned to test, 
evaluate, and acquire a new life-flight transport ventilator, and Madeline Witte, M.D., a 
member of that committee and the director of Primary Children's life-flight program. R. 
1237, 51:7-9, R. 1233-35, 33:19-41:10, R. 1230, 22:18-24, 23:3-4; R. 1228, 14:3-21; R. 
1229,19:2-7. Additional members assigned to the committee by Tammy Bleak were neo-
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i latal life -flight i 11 u ses, it icli idii ig K at! iiy R I te respiratory therapist Kevin Crezee, and 
clinical engineer Ramsey Worman. R. 1233-35, 33:19-41; 10. 
10. Derek Nguyen, as a patient in the intensive care unit was assigned a 
multi-disciplinary health-care team and 
F — lo, K. 1245,99:7-23. 
11. Shortly after it appeared that the clinical e\ aluation could not proceed, 
Tammy Bleak and Dr. Witte decided lo use the sales model, in violation of the hospital rules, 
to transport Dei CK iui u •- .*.... . , ., tne intensive ..su ». m ; c 
an i • • - • v. 1245,97:3-104:13. 
12. Dr. Witte called Tamm> Bleak, indicating that she, Dr. Witte, had a 
patient (to wit, Derek Nguyen)., on whom they could use the sales-modei \ entilatoi * . , 
87:15-88:3; R. 1255, 42.1 y 4 \ 2 \ I annus Bleak Icsdl.cd: 
Q: '. Okay. ;A - , j r . wn, i^ Witte called you? Did you 
have possuwiuii of the ventilators which were to be 
clinically evaluated? 
A: She would have I don't recaii n i Had po^es-ion. She 
\\ ould have called me because I was over the-, -mmittee, 
So I ;'-Oul;! n^of^h/^ \\ l,:vc* '"' "*"* "f*eded. 
Q: ' Meaning you could mobilize you lost me there. W hat 
could you mobilize? 
• A : As I told you earlier, I was the one who had contact with 
the vendors, with Paul, so she would have called me as 
the chair of the committee to say, we have a patient we 
could use this on. That's why I was called. 
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R. 1243, 87:15-88:3. (emphasis added). 
13. Dr. Witte did not consult with the other members of Derek Nguyen's 
multi-disciplinary health-care team, nor anyone else before offering him as a test subject for 
the sales-model ventilator. R. 1256, 48:21-25; R. 1257, 52:6-21; R. 1258, 61:3-16; 1260, 
79:20-24; R. 1333, 141:9-19; R. 1346-47,189:22-190:3; R. 1351,194:21-24. 
14. Defendants' agents used Derek Nguyen to test the sales model 
ventilator. R. 1245, 98:9-100:17; R. 1247, 107:11-108:16, R. 1243, 87:10-14, R. 3249. 
15. Defendants' personnel assigned to evaluate the sales model, gathered 
to observe and evaluate and the salesman, Paul Astle, also attended to answer any questions 
they might have, as the sales model was used to transport critically-ill, unstable Derek 
Nguyen. R. 1244-45, 94:8-100:17, R. 1233, 34:10-23; R. 1234, 40:3-10.. 
16. In addition to being chairperson of the committee, Tammy Bleak was 
Primary Children's Services Equipment Specialist. R. 1226-27,8:9-9:2, R. 1233-35,33:19-
41:10, R. 1237,51:7-9. 
17. Tammy Bleak acknowledged that, as Children's Services Equipment 
Specialist, she had the duty to ensure reliability of the sales-model ventilator through 
completion of the testing and evaluation process (called the CTM process), before allowing 
its use on a patient outside the testing and evaluation parameters. R. 1242,72:10-73:18; R. 
1231-32, 24:24-31:21; R. 1232,29:23-30:5, R. 1233, 33:13-15. 
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1! !, I )4-hiiKl,mli;' afenls knew uiai ;iiven Derek's condition, he could not 
tolerate even a brief interruption in his ventilation, and they were aware that the sales-model 
ventilator was untested and could fail. R 1261, IPiH) L!. K. L1«)4J2()> 
g2:23-84: L\U L!4 *, K(>.K II,1'!1 K I l-' IN.1 IHK I ' "< V f V> 's II l'<. 
19. Dr. Wifi li'Vh!!v A
 WOuld have waited additional time before 
transporting Derek for a CT scan, if the sales model ventilator were tin MI the hospi-.i* ^ 
1255, 43:8-22. She testified that the only reason she ordered transport <-; i JCICU •Nguwn at 
the time she did, was because the sales-modd \ cntilaloi w its in (In: ho , .. 
v. iHiiliil IIMW de l n i n i (in <' I SHYI'IIII hi . _ • 
20. No emergency or oilier ^o:n uon existed to justify disregard of the 
hospital rules and use of the untested sales model on a critically-ill, uii>L«i>le ,uiiiu.. a.ut 
without parental permiss?.) ^ ^ 
21. 1; i^ned that that interruption in Derek's ventilation from 
failure of the sales model led to significant deterioration, from which Derek was not able to 
recover, and, as a result, he died. R. 1264, 120:5-9. 
• 22. Katnsin Woiniiih m rii/nihi >l f l i e i ' l lV l I'omnnllfr ninl .t N M U M I 
engineer at Primary Children's, testified that he felt Primary Children's inspection of the 
ventilator was inadequate. R. 1372,42:15-49:24. He disagreed with the hospital's decision 
to test it on any patients, let alone critically-ill pah.. •. a > :d. . 
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23. Before using the sales model on Derek, defendants' agents had never 
previously used it to transport anyone, nor even attached it to any patient, let alone to 
transport a critically-ill, medically-unstable child, and had not even given the sales-model a 
trial run to see if it would function properly on a trip between the intensive care unit and the 
radiology department R. 1247, 108:17-25. 
24. Prior to transporting Derek via the sales model, defendants' agents did 
not inform Derek's father that the ventilator was a sales model, that it was in the hospital for 
testing, that hospital rules prohibited its use on a patient in Derek's condition, that it had 
never previously been used to transport anyone, attached to anyone, nor even taken on a trial 
run, nor did they inform Derek's father that, given Derek's condition, he was unlikely to 
survive a malfunction of the sales model. R. 3514, 92:4-17. 
25. During transport, the untested sales model malfunctioned and, as a 
result, Derek died. R. 1246-48, 103:7-113:10, R. 1264, 120:5-9. 
26. Plaintiff Buu Nguyen suffered severe emotional distress as a result of 
the death ofhis son Derek. R.3166-67,R. 1396,13:23-14:20, R. 1399,17:2-18:4, R. 3503, 
45:9-48:2; R. 3508-09, 67:19-68:8. 
27. Plaintiff filed suit, asserting causes of action for defendants' failure to 
obtain informed consent, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
recklessness, justifying punitive damages. R. 64-75. 
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Dr. Goidenring's Qualifications 
28. Plaintiff retained John Goldenring, M.D., a board-certified 
pediatrician practicing since 1977 who also has extensive experience in administrative 
medicine, to address the standard of care applicable to defendants, defendants' breaches 
of the standard of care, defendants' failures to obtain informed consent and the cause of 
Derek Nguyen's death. R. 1295-1311,79:11-95:4. 
29. Dr. Goldenring has worked in several hospitals similar to Primary 
Children's, including Los Angeles Children's, San Diego Children's, and Galveston's 
Children's, and has cared for critically-ill children, like Derek Nguyen, in pediatric 
intensive care units. R. 1326-27,124:25-125:4; R. 1314, 110:3-11. 
30. Dr. Goldenring has held positions with several universities as an 
assistant and associate professor of pediatrics. R. 1385-86. 
31. Dr. Goldenring has more than 10 years of experience in 
administrative medicine, including every aspect of quality of care in hospitals, review of 
critical care services, and review of hospital administration. R. 1314, 110:17-24; R. 
1315,111:3-12; R. 1328,126:7-9. 
32. Dr. Goldenring has been involved in informed consent issues in 
hospital care for many years. R. 1338, 153:18-21. 
33. A copy of Dr. Goidenring's Curriculum Vitae is attached with his 
expert witness report as R. 1376-88. 
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Dr. Goldenring's Opinions 
Standard of Care Proscribed Use of the Sales Model on Derek 
34. Dr. Goldenring opines that the standard of care proscribed defendants' 
use of the sales-model ventilator on Derek Nguyen, a critically-ill, medically unstable child. 
R. 1329-31, 129:20-131:4, R. 1315-17, 111:22-113:17. 
35. Dr. Goldenring testified that the standard of care required physicians and 
hospital staff to adhere to hospital rules, including the hospital's rule that sales-model 
ventilator not be used on critically-ill, medically unstable patients. R. 1316-17, 112:23-
113:17; R. 1329-31,129:20-131:16, 131:5-9, R. 1287-88,70:2-71:25. 
Standard of Care Required Parental Permission 
36. Dr. Goldenring opines that the standard of care required defendants to 
obtain the permission of Derek's father before using the sales-model ventilator on Derek. R. 
1316-18, 112:23-114:5; R. 1329-30, 129:20-130:16; R. 1291-93,74:8-77:9. 
37. Dr. Goldenring testified that the standard of care required physicians and 
hospital staff to adhere to hospital rules, including the hospital's rule that permission be 
obtained before using the sales-model ventilator on Derek. R. 1316-18, 112:23-114:5; R. 
1329-31, 129:20-131:16; R. 1291-93,75:17-77:14. 
Standard of Care Required Consultation with Derek's Health-Care Team 
38. Dr. Goldenring testifies that at the time of Derek's hospital stay, it was 
standard care in the pediatric intensive care unit at a major children's hospital, like Primary 
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Children's, for a multi-disciplinary health-care team to be assigned to and care for a 
critically-ill child like Derek Nguyen. R. 1314, 110:3-11; R. 1289, 73:21-24, 73:8-16; R. 
1363,211:20-22. 
39. Dr. Goldenring testified that moving a critically-ill child generally 
involves substantial risk, and in Derek Nguyen's case involved great risk. R. 1282-83, 
53:20-54:30; R. 1284, 60:17-19. 
40. Dr. Goldenring testified that prior to attempting to transport a 
critically-ill child like Derek Nguyen, using an untested sales-model ventilator, the standard 
of care required consultation with members of the child's multi-disciplinary health-care team: 
I think that what I was testifying to previously, and I still believe, is that 
everyone involved in the care or in this case in the process of 
determining whether this ventilator should be used should have been on 
a list of people who should be talked to before trying something like 
this 
I guess my take on it is that this should really be a team discussion, not 
an individual decision by any one person unless there's no real team 
and there's no choices in the matter. I think if you're at a major 
children's hospital where you have a number of people involved in 
care, before you decide at any point that you're going to move that 
patient, knowing it's inherently dangerous, you should be sure that the 
likelihood is that you must have it now, and that you will get 
information that will have major impact on clinical care before you 
move the child. 
R. 1347-48, 190:20-191:5, 191:15-25. 
41. Dr. Goldenring testified that his opinion on the standard of care is 
corroborated by, and totally consistent with the clinical practice guideline of the American 
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Association for Respiratory Care ("AARC") titled "In-Hospital Transport of the 
Mechanically Ventilated Patient" R. 1345,186:22-24; R. 1346,189:19-21; R. 1349,192:1-
17, R. 1352-57, 196:5-201:13; R. 1358-61, 206:16-209:8; R. 1364,215:12-17. 
42. The transport guideline is published by the AARC for general use by 
health-care practitioners, including multi-disciplinary health-care teams such as the one 
assigned to Derek Nguyen's care. R. 1340-41, 179:18-180:12; R. 1342-43,182:19-183:11. 
43. Dr. Goldenring noted that the AARC transport guideline states in 
relevant part-
Transportation of mechanical ventilated patients for diagnostic or 
therapeutic procedures is always associated with a degree of risk. 
Transportation of the mechanically ventilated patient should not be 
undertaken until a complete analysis of potential risk and benefits has 
been accomplished. 
The literature suggests that nearly two-thirds of all transports for 
diagnostic studies fail to yield results that affect patient care. 
The necessity and safety for transport should be assessed by the 
multidisciplinary team of health-care providers, e.g., respiratory 
therapist, physician, nurse. The risks of transport should be weighed 
against the potential benefits from the diagnostic or therapeutic 
procedure to be performed. 
R. 1345, 186:22-24; R. 1346,189:19-21; R. 1349, 192:7-12; R. 1358,206:19-22. See also, 
R. 1391-93. (emphasis added). 
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Defendants' Breaches of Standard Care 
44. Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants' agents breached the standard of 
care by using the sales-model on Derek who was critically-ill and medically unstable, using 
it on Derek without his father's permission, and using it without first consulting Derek's 
multi-disciplinary health-care team. R. 1361-62, 209:21-210:21; R. 1315-18,111:22-114:5; 
R. 1329-30,129:20-130:1; R. 1289,73:12-24; R. 1331,131:5-9; R. 1287-88,70:2-71:25; R. 
1290-93, 74:8-77:9; R. 1359-61, 207:13-209:8. 
45. Dr. Goldenring explained the proper course to have followed: 
They also should be - what I think they would be 
concerned about is that first, yes, they should be asked, do you think 
you can transport this child safely because I've talked to the 
neurosurgeons - let me make a hypothetical as to how I would want to 
see it. I've talked to neurosurgeons, they really think they need it now, 
and I think that makes sense, and the right way to do it is to ask the 
respiratory therapist and the nurses who are going to be involved, are 
there any concerns you want to talk about. In this case though it goes 
beyond that because we have the new ventilator issues, so there's really 
two things going on, the clinical issue, and are we going to accomplish 
it using this ventilator that we haven't put through the full process so 
we've decided that we're going to buy it and use it. So there are really 
two parts to the thing. 
The second part, those people who were involved in the 
committee, at the very least some of those people should have been 
asked is this an appropriate use for the ventilator, because, again, I'm 
taking an extra chance on top of everything else by using something 
that we haven't fully tested and have never used before in the hospital 
on an actual patient. 
R. 1350-51, 193:4-194:1. See also, R. 1359-61,207:13-209:8. 
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Defendants' Failure to Obtain Informed Consent 
46. Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants' use of the sales-model ventilator 
on Derek Nguyen carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing serious and 
foreseeable harm to Derek Nguyen, not only because moving a critically-ill child is highly 
dangerous in and of itself, but because the sales-model ventilator used by defendants had not 
been tested pursuant to the hospital's protocols, and could not be relied on to function 
properly during transport of a critically-ill child. R. 1320-21,117:24-119:23. 
47. Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants failed to properly inform Derek's 
father of the risks involved, including the fact that the sales model had not been tested 
pursuant to protocol, and that even a brief interruption in his son's ventilation could be 
deadly. R. 1321, 119:24-121:9; R. 1316-18, 112:23-114:5; R. 1290-93,74:8-77:9. 
48. Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants' failure to obtain informed 
consent resulted in the harm to Derek Nguyen and the plaintiff. R. 1323-25, 121:10-123:8. 
Causation 
49. Dr. Goldenring opines that as a result of defendants' breaches of 
standard of care and failure to obtain informed consent, Derek Nguyen died. R. 1318,114:6-
115:10. 
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50. Dr. Goldenring bases his opinion in part on Dr. Witte's testimony that 
interruption in Derek's ventilation from failure of the sales model led to significant 
deterioration, from which Derek was not able to recover. Id. and R. 1264, 120:5-9. 
51. Compliance with the hospital's rules to evaluate the sales-model 
ventilators on moderately-ill, stable patients likely would likely have revealed, without 
disastrous consequence, the defect in the sales-model ventilator. R. 1334-35,147:25-150:5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs medical expert, Dr. 
Goldenring, was not qualified to testify about standards of care applicable to defendants' 
agents, Tammy Bleak and Dr. Witte, about defendants' failures to obtain informed consent, 
and about the cause of Derek Nguyen's death. Sufficient foundation was laid to establish Dr. 
Goldenring's knowledge of standards of care applicable defendants' agents, requirements of 
informed consent, and causation of Dererk Nguyen's death. 
Dr. Goldenring was not required to have matching specialties, titles, licenses, 
or the like to testify about standards of care with which he is well-familiar and that are 
applicable to defendants' agents. Dr. Goldenring offers no opinions that require expertise 
in critical care, pulmonology, respiratory therapy, or nursing. His criticisms of defendants' 
agents are limited to their conduct in their roles as health-care providers providing patient 
care in the hospital, as members of Derek Nguyen's multi-disciplinary health-care team, and 
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in their administrative roles in the hospital. Finally, his testimony about the cause of Derek's 
death is not speculative, since he expressed his knowledge and opinion as to why Derek died. 
POINT II. 
The trial court erroneously entered summary judgment of plaintiff s negligence 
and informed consent causes of action even after excluding Dr. Goldenring, since some of 
plaintiffs claims are established by other evidence, including the admissions of defendants' 
agents, and are amenable to lay understanding. These include plaintiff s claim that defendant 
Primary Children's agent, Tammy Bleak, was negligent in using Derek to test the sales-
model ventilator before she had fulfilled her duty of establishing its reliability through the 
CTM testing and evaluation process. Also, expert testimony was not essential to plaintiffs 
claim that defendants' agents, Tammy Bleak and Dr. Witte, were negligent in using Derek 
to test the sales model in violation of the hospital's rules that it not be used on a critically-ill 
or medically-unstable child, and negligent in using the sales model on Derek without full 
disclosure of the risks to his father, and without his father's permission. 
POINT III. 
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment against plaintiffs claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Utah appellate court precedents establish that 
plaintiffs evidence meets the threshold to maintain his cause of action. 
In violation of hospital rules, defendants' agents used plaintiffs critically-ill, 
medically-unstable son, without plaintiffs permission, to test a sales-model ventilator that 
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they were considering for purchase. The sales model had never previously been attached to 
any patient, let alone a critically-ill, unstable patient. Defendants' agents did not even take 
it on a trial run. Defendants' agent, Tammy Bleak, knew that she had not assessed the 
reliability of the sales model for patient use pursuant to the hospital's testing and evaluation 
requirements. Defendants' agents also knew that Derek was ventilator-dependent and would 
likely not be able to tolerate even a brief interruption in his ventilation. 
Defendants' conduct was "of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and 
intolerable in that [it] offend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality." As a result of the conduct of defendants' agents, plaintiffs son died. A 
reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' conduct was outrageous and that, as a result, 
plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. 
POINT IV. 
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment of plaintiffs punitive 
damage claim against defendant Primary Children's Medical Center. Based on the same 
facts and conduct of defendants summarized in POINT III, a reasonable jury could determine 
that defendant's conduct manifests a knowing and reckless disregard for Derek Nguyen's 
safety and for the rights of plaintiff. 
-18-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PRECLUDING DR. GOLDENRING FROM TESTIFYING AT 
TRIAL RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE AND 
LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CLAIMS. 
A. Dr. Goldenring's Expert Opinions, the Foundation for 
Those Opinions, and Dr. Goldenring's Qualifications to 
Express His Opinions Supporting Plaintiffs Negligence and 
Lack of Informed Consent Claims 
1. Dr. Goldenring's Opinion That Defendants' 
Agents Breached the Standard of Care by Using the 
Sales Model on Derek. 
As set forth above, Dr. Goldenring testified that defendants' agents breached 
the standard of care in using the sales-model ventilator on Derek Nguyen. Dr. Goldenring 
testified that the standard of care proscribed defendants' use of the sales-model ventilator on 
Derek Nguyen, a critically-ill, medically unstable child. He based his opinion, in part, on the 
fact that the standard of care required physicians and hospital staff to adhere to hospital rules, 
including the hospital's rule that the sales-model ventilator not be used on critically-ill, 
medically unstable patients. 
Dr. Goldenring is qualified to render the above opinions because he is a board-
certified pediatrician practicing since 1977 who also has extensive experience in 
administrative medicine. He has worked in hospitals similar to Primary Children's, including 
Los Angeles Children's, San Diego Children's, and Galveston's Children's, and has cared 
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for critically-ill children like Derek Nguyen in pediatric intensive care units. Dr. Goldenring 
has also held positions as Assistant and Associate Professor of Pediatrics with several 
universities. Dr. Goldenring has more than 10 years of experience in administrative 
medicine, including every aspect of quality of care in hospitals, review of critical care 
services, and review of hospital administration. 
2. Dr. Goldenring's Opinion That Defendants' 
Agents Breached the Standard of Care by Not 
Obtaining Parental Permission to Use the Sales Model 
on Derek 
Dr. Goldenring is of the opinion that defendants' agents breached the standard 
of care in failing to disclose risks and obtain the permission of Derek's father to use the 
sales-model on Derek. Dr. Goldenring testified that it is standard care at major children's 
hospitals, like Primary Children's, for physicians and hospital staff to disclose risks and 
obtain parental permission before undertaking a procedure that entails a substantial risk of 
harm to that parent's child. Dr. Goldenring testified that using the untested sales-model 
ventilator on Derek did entail a substantial risk of harm and defendants failed to obtain the 
permission of Derek's father. 
Dr. Goldenring also bases his opinion on the fact that the hospital had 
established rules, both through the CTM process and its "Patient Bill of Rights", that 
required its agents to obtain parental permission before using the sales model on a child in 
the hospital. Dr. Goldenring testified that the standard of care required physicians and 
hospital staff to adhere to its rules for patient care in the hospital. 
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As with defendants' breach in using the sales model on Derek, Dr. Goldenring 
is qualified to render the above opinions because he is a board-certified pediatrician 
practicing since 1977 who also has extensive experience in administrative medicine. He has 
worked in hospitals similar to Primary Children's, including Los Angeles Children's, San 
Diego Children's, and Galveston's Children's, and has cared for critically-ill children like 
Derek Nguyen in pediatric intensive care units. Dr. Goldenring has also held positions as 
Assistant and Associate Professor of Pediatrics with several universities. Dr. Goldenring has 
more than 10 years of experience in administrative medicine, including every aspect of 
quality of care in hospitals, review of critical care services, and review of hospital 
administration. 
3. Dr. Goldenring's Opinion That Defendants5 Agent, 
Dr. Witte, Breached the Standard of Care by Failing 
to Consult with Derek's Multi-disciplinary Health-
care Team Before Transporting Derek via the Sales 
Model. 
Dr. Goldenring opines that at the time of Derek's hospital stay, it was standard 
care in the pediatric intensive care unit at major children's hospital, like Primary Children's, 
for a multi-disciplinary health-care team to be assigned to and care for a critically-ill child 
like Derek Nguyen. Dr. Goldenring testified that moving a critically-ill child generally 
involves substantial risk, and in Derek Nguyen's case involved great risk. Dr. Goldenring 
testified that prior to attempting to transport a critically-ill child like Derek Nguyen, using 
an untested sales-model ventilator, the standard of care required consultation with members 
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of the child's multi-disciplinary health-care team, including the neurosurgeons, nurses, and 
respiratory therapist: 
I think that what I was testifying to previously, and I still believe, is that 
everyone involved in the care or in this case in the process of 
determining whether this ventilator should be used should have been on 
a list of people who should be talked to before trying something like 
this . . . . 
I guess my take on it is that this should really be a team discussion, not 
an individual decision by any one person unless there's no real team 
and there's no choices in the matter. I think if you're at a major 
children's hospital where you have a number of people involved in 
care, before you decide at any point that you're going to move that 
patient, knowing it's inherently dangerous, you should be sure that the 
likelihood is that you must have it now, and that you will get 
information that will have major impact on clinical care before you 
move the child. 
R. 1347-38,190:20-191:5, 191:15-25. 
Dr. Goldenring testified that his opinion on the standard of care in regard to 
consultation with the multi-disciplinary health-care team before transporting a critically-ill 
patient, is corroborated by and totally consistent with the clinical practice guideline of the 
American Association for Respiratory Care ("AARC") titled "In-Hospital Transport of the 
Mechanically Ventilated Patient." The transport guideline is published by the AARC for 
general use by health-care practitioners, including multi-disciplinary health-care teams, such 
as the one assigned to Derek Nguyen's care. Dr. Goldenring testified that Defendants' agent, 
Dr. Witte, breached the standard of care by excluding team members and unilaterally 
deciding to transport Derek via the sales model. 
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In addition to Dr. Goldenring's previously-detailed qualifications, he is 
qualified to express the above opinions because he is familiar with standard care in regard 
to the duty of the members of a multi-disciplinary health-care team to consult with all team 
members prior to deciding to transport a critically-ill child. Dr. Goldenring has served on 
multi-disciplinary health-care teams caring for critically-ill children like Derek Nguyen in 
pediatric intensive care units in major children's hospitals, like Primary Children's. 
4. Dr. Goldenring's Opinion Regarding Defendants' 
Failure to Obtain Informed Consent. 
Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants' use of the sales-model ventilator on 
Derek Nguyen carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing serious and 
foreseeable harm to Derek Nguyen, not only because moving a critically-ill child is highly 
dangerous in and of itself, but because the sales-model ventilator used by defendants had not 
been tested by the hospital's protocols and could not be relied on to function properly during 
transport of a critically-ill child. Dr. Goldenring opines that defendants failed to properly 
inform Derek's father of the risks involved, including the fact that the sales model had not 
been tested pursuant to protocol, and that even a brief interruption in his son's ventilation 
could be deadly. Defendants' agents never asked for, nor got plaintiffs consent. Dr. 
Goldenring opines that defendants' failure to obtain informed consent resulted in harm to 
Derek Nguyen and his father, the plaintiff. 
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Dr. Goldenring is qualified to express the above opinions based on his 
previously-detailed, experience, training, and education. Additionally, Dr. Goldenring has 
been involved in informed consent issues in hospital care for many years. 
5. Dr. Goldenring's Testimony Regarding Causation 
of Derek's Death 
Dr. Goldenring testified that as a result of the sales-model failure, Derek 
Nguyen died. He bases this opinion on the fact that Derek was critically ill, unstable and, at 
the time defendants attached him to the sales model, he was dependent on uninterrupted 
ventilation to sustain his life. He also bases this opinion on the fact that after the sales model 
malfunctioned, Derek immediately deteriorated and, in spite of extreme efforts to revive him, 
he could not recover from the interruption to his ventilation. Dr. Goldenring also notes that 
his opinion regarding causation is corroborated by the opinion of Dr. Witte, who testified that 
the interruption in Derek's ventilation was the cause of Derek's death. 
Dr. Goldenring is qualified to render the above opinions for all the reasons 
noted above, including that he is a board-certified pediatrician practicing since 1977 who has 
cared for critically-ill patients like Derek Nguyen. 
B. The Trial Court Erroneously Excluded Dr. Goldenring 
The trial court did not fully recognize or appreciate Dr. Goldenring's 
qualifications and opinions, and the foundation for his opinions, as set forth in detail above. 
Instead, the trial court ruled that Dr. Goldenring was not qualified to testify to standards of 
care applicable to defendants' agents, Dr. Witte and the hospital staff, including nurses and 
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respiratory therapists, to testify about informed consent, or to testify about causation of 
Derek's death. R. 2589-96. 
The trial court also erroneously concluded that Dr. Goldenring was offering 
opinions about standards and issues exclusive to Dr. Witte's subspecialties and exclusive to 
nursing and respiratory therapy. Dr. Goldenring never offered any such opinions. To the 
contrary, as set forth extensively above, Dr. Goldenring offered opinions only about 
standards of care applicable to all health-care providers providing patient care in the hospital, 
applicable to all members of a multi-disciplinary health-care team attending to a critically-ill 
child, and applicable to administrators in a major children's hospital. Dr. Goldenring is well-
qualified to establish such standards of care and render opinions about the conduct of 
defendants' agents in relation to such standards. The trial court abused its discretion in 
precluding Dr. Goldenring from testifying at trial. The court should reverse the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment and remand for trial. 
1. Dr. Goldenring Is Not Required to Have Matching 
Sub-specialties, Titles, Licenses or the Like to 
Establish a Standard of Care Applicable to 
Defendants' Agents, 
The trial court criticized Dr. Goldenring for not having the same sub-specialties 
as Dr. Witte and for not being a nurse or respiratory therapist. R. 2589-95, pp. 1-3,6-7. The 
trial court noted that while Dr. Goldenring is a board-certified pediatrician, just like Dr. 
Witte, they have different sub-specialties. Also, the trial court believed that Dr. Goldenring 
could not establish a standard of care applicable to a nurse or respiratory therapist. 
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Utah appellate case law has long made clear that an expert of one medical 
specialty need not be of the same medical specialty of a defendant in order to establish a 
standard of care applicable to that defendant. See, e.g., Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 7, ff 14, 
15. Rather than matching titles, licenses, specialties, or the like, a medical expert may 
establish an applicable standard of care so long as sufficient foundation is laid to establish 
the expert's knowledge of the standard of care applicable to the defendant. Id. 
In Boice, the trial court had granted summary judgment to the defendant, 
physiatrist Dr. Marble, after striking the affidavit of neurosurgeon Dr. Cantu, which was 
offered against Dr. Marble. Id., at fflf 13-15. Dr. Cantu testified that Dr. Marble had 
breached the standard of care in the post-operative care he provided to the plaintiff. Id. The 
trial court, adopting the same argument that the trial court adopted in the case at bar, 
concluded that because Dr. Cantu practiced in a field different than Dr. Marble's, he was 
incompetent to testify to the appropriate standard of care for Dr. Marble. Id., at f 13. 
Reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that Dr. Cantu's affidavit set forth sufficient foundation to establish that Dr. 
Cantu, a neurosurgeon, was knowledgeable about the standard of care applicable to Dr. 
Marble, a physiatrist. Id. at f 15. The court stated, 
An expert witness belonging to one school may testify against a 
member of another school once the expert provides sufficient 
foundation to show that the method of treatment at issue is common 
to both schools or that the expert is knowledgeable about the standard 
of care of the other school. See, Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 
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248 (Utah 1985), cited in Arnold v. Curtis, 846P.2d 1307,1310(Utah 
1993). 
M , a t ^ l 5 
Similarly, in Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
although not an "endodontist" in name or specialty, a general dentist was qualified by his 
knowledge of and experience in endodontic procedures to render opinions about the cause 
of endodontic injuries and the need for endodontic treatment. Id. at f^ 18. There, as in the 
case at bar, the defendant attacked the qualifications of plaintiff s expert to testify about the 
material issues in the case: 
Lainhart asserts that Dr. Bitner cannot testify about endodontic 
treatments because he is not an endodontist Dr. Bitner practices 
general dentistry . . . . Dr. Bitner cannot hold himself out as an 
endodontist, Lainhart argues, because he does not limit his practice 
to endodontic treatments. Lainhart also asserts that Dr. Bitner's 
decision to consult specialists in the course of his diagnosis and 
treatment of Patey is an admission that he was unqualified in the area 
of endodontics. 
Id. at Tflj 15, 17. (emphasis added). 
The supreme court rejected defendant's arguments, finding that Dr. Bitner, 
although not an "endodontist" was qualified to give expert opinions. Id., at f 18. The court 
stated, "The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that 
expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it" Id., 
citing Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). (emphasis 
added). The court also stated, 
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Furthermore, Dr. Bitner's consultation of other experts in the field of 
endodontics did not disqualify him from testifying on the subject 
himself. Simply because an expert, qualified under Rule 702, admits 
that he or she consults other experts or admits that other specialists may 
be more qualified in some areas, does not render that expert unqualified 
to testify in a matter. The rules of evidence establish a minimum 
baseline for expert qualifications. They do not mandate that litigants 
call only the most highly qualified experts to testify. Dr. Bitner 
established that he was qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education [to] testify" about Patey's dental diagnosis and 
treatment. Utah R. Evid. 702. 
A/., at 119. 
Just as in Boice and Patey, in the matter at bar, sufficient foundation was laid 
for Dr. Goldenring to testify on the material issues of the case. Dr. Goldenring's testimony 
established his knowledge of standards of care applicable to defendants' agents, Dr. Witte 
and Tammy Bleak. Dr. Goldenring testified that, based on his experience, training, and 
education, he is knowledgeable of the standard of care requiring all health-care providers 
caring for hospital patients to adhere to hospital rules, and the standard of care requiring 
hospital administrators to adhere to hospital rules. He also established his knowledge of the 
standard of care that requires all members of a multi-disciplinary health-care team to consult 
with team members before deciding to transport a critically-ill or medically-unstable patient. 
As set forth in greater detail above, Dr. Goldenring has worked at major 
children's hospitals like Primary Children's, has been the attending physician for critically-ill 
children in the pediatric intensive care unit, like Derek Nguyen, has been on the very type of 
multi-disciplinary healthcare team that was attending to Derek Nguyen, and has extensive 
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experience in administrative medicine, including quality assurance of all aspects of hospital 
care, review of critical-care services, and review of hospital administration. 
As additional foundation, Dr. Goldenring presented the clinical practice 
guideline of the American Association for Respiratory Care ("AARC") titled "In-Hospital 
Transport of the Mechanically Ventilated Patient" which corroborates his opinions. He 
testified that the transport guideline is published by the AARC for general use by health-care 
practitioners, including multi-disciplinary health-care teams such as the one assigned to 
Derek Nguyen's care. Thus, sufficient foundation was laid before the trial court for Dr. 
Goldenring's opinions, and the trial court abused its discretion in excluding him as an expert 
witness 
2. Dr. Goldenring Has Offered No Opinions on 
Matters Requiring Expertise in Dr. Witte's Sub-
specialties, Nursing, or Respiratory Therapy. 
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the trial court did not recognize the nature and 
extent of Dr. Goldenring's opinions and the foundation for those opinions, and so based its 
exclusion of Dr. Goldenring on matters irrelevant to the case at bar and on which Dr. 
Goldenring offers no opinion. Thus, the trial court found Dr. Goldenring unqualified to serve 
as an expert against Dr. Witte, because he could not address Dr. Witte's decision-making 
process as a critical-care sub-specialist in ordering a repeat CT scan. That, however, is not 
at issue. Dr. Goldenring accepted Dr. Witte's conclusion that a repeat CT scan was desirable 
at some point. Before Dr. Witte came to that conclusion, Derek's neurosurgeons had already 
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placed an order for one, once it became appropriate to transport him for one. R. 1258,61:12-
62:4. Dr. Goldenring also accepts Dr. Witte's testimony that she only ordered transport of 
Derek at the time she did, because the sales model ventilator was in the hospital. Otherwise, 
she testified, she would have waited to transport Derek for the repeat CT scan. Dr. 
Goldenring is entitled to accept Dr. Witte's statements, since an expert witness may consider, 
accept, or even rely on the testimony of other experts in reaching his own expert conclusions. 
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Dr. Goldenring is critical, and is competent to be critical, of Dr. Witte's 
decision to use the untested ventilator on Derek (1) contrary to hospital rules, (2) before it 
had been determined reliable through the hospital's required testing and evaluation, (3) 
without consulting Derek's multi-disciplinary health-care team, (4) without disclosing the 
risks to Derek's father, (5) without permission from Derek's father, and (6) for the purpose 
of providing a test subject for the sales-model ventilator, which was all in violation of 
standards of care applicable to all health-care providers in the hospital, to all the members 
of Derek's multi-disciplinary health-care team, and applicable to Dr. Witte in her 
administrative role as a member of the CTM committee. In no way is Dr. Goldenring 
second-guessing Dr. Witte's critical care analysis. On the contrary, he is accepting it, and 
after accepting it, is finding breaches of standard care in her roles as a health-care team 
member, as a provider of health care in the hospital, and as a CTM committee member. 
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Likewise, the trial court's criticisms that the sales model was FDA approved 
and that Dr. Goldenring is not an expert on differing methods of ventilation are irrelevant to 
Dr. Goldenring's ability to address the material issues in the case. FDA approval of a certain 
type of ventilator does not make a specific unit reliable. It does not preempt hospital rules 
about determining the reliability of a given unit and limiting the use of that unit on critically-
ill and medically-unstable children. It does not preempt the duty of a team member to consult 
other team members about using an untested sales model contrary to hospital rules or the duty 
to disclose risks to a parent and get permission. The duties and standards exist and are not 
relieved by FDA approval. 
Alternative methods of ventilation are likewise irrelevant to Dr. Goldenring's 
opinions and qualifications. At issue is whether defendants' agents breached standards of 
care and failed to obtain informed consent when they violated hospital rules and when they 
did not consult with Derek's team about using the sales model on Derek. Dr. Goldenring 
needs no expertise in alternative ventilation methods to render his opinions that defendants' 
agents breached the standard of care in the way they used this, sales-model ventilator. 
Dr. Goldenring offers no opinions on matters that require expertise in critical 
care, pulmonology, nursing, or respiratory therapy. The opinions expressed by Dr. 
Goldenring, his qualifications to render these, and their foundation are set forth above. The 
trial court abused its discretion in precluding Dr. Goldenring from rendering these opinions 
at trial. 
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C. Dr. Goldenring's Causation Testimony Is Not 
Speculative 
The trial court also adopted defendants' erroneous argument that Dr. 
Goldenring's causation testimony was speculative. R. 2595-96. It is not speculative, as set 
forth in his deposition: 
Q: Do you have an opinion whether Dr. Witte's breach of the standard of 
care resulted in harm to Derek Nguyen? 
A: Well, yes. Because this ventilator was used, the child ended up having 
the feared complication, which is something went wrong, very bad 
luck, and they were not able to overcome the loss of ventilation that 
occurred. This machine essentially quit. It was faulty. Perhaps the 
entire design was faulty, but what happened was in fact it quit, and at 
that point, that stressed this child enough that they were not able to 
recover. 
Q: And he perished. 
A: I believe that that's what the record shows and also that that is what in 
fact even Dr. Witte told the father in the conference notes that we - that 
I have just reviewed today. 
R. 1318,114:6-20. Besides expressing his own opinion, Dr. Goldenring noted that Dr. Witte 
too had expressed the opinion that Derek died as a result of the sales-model malfunction. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AFTER EXCLUDING DR. GOLDENRING, SINCE 
SOME OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE ESTABLISHED BY 
OTHER EVIDENCE IN THE CASE WHICH IS AMENABLE TO 
LAY UNDERSTANDING. 
After the trial court had entered summary judgment of plaintiff s claims for 
emotional distress and punitive damages, and after defendants persuaded the trial court to 
preclude Dr. Goldenring from testifying, they moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs 
remaining claims of negligence and lack of informed consent. Plaintiff responded that, while 
Dr. Goldenring's testimony was important to assist the trier of fact to resolve these issues, 
his testimony was not essential to maintain the causes of action at trial. R. 3060, R. 3531, 
11:2-12:7. 
Duty and standards of care applicable to defendants' agents in the case at bar 
have been established by the testimony of those agents. As Primary Children's Equipment 
Specialist, Tammy Bleak testified that before using the sales-model ventilator for patient 
care, it was her duty to ensure its reliability through completion of the testing and evaluation 
process required by the hospital. The evidence establishes that she failed in this duty by 
allowing the sales model to be used on Derek Nguyen, before it had been tested and 
evaluated. 
Defendants' agents have also testified that hospital rules prohibited use of the 
sales model on any child without parental consent and on any critically-ill or medically-
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unstable child. Evidence in the case, independent of Dr. Goldenring, establishes that 
defendants' agents negligently violated the hospital rules in this regard by using the sales 
model on Derek Nguyen, a critically-ill, medically-unstable child. They were also negligent 
in using Derek as a test subject without obtaining his father's permission, after full disclosure 
of the risks. Evidence independent of Dr. Goldenring shows that as a result of the negligent 
conduct of defendants' agents, Derek Nguyen died. 
Understanding the above matters does not require esoteric medical knowledge. 
A lay person can understand Tammy Bleak's duty and the hospital rules proscribing use of 
the sales model on Derek Nguyen. In such a case, a jury of lay people may determine the 
issues without the guidance offered by an expert. Newman v. Sonnenberg, 2003 UT App. 
401,1|7. 
While, by no means preferable to having the expert guidance of Dr. Goldenring 
on all of plaintiff s claims, some of the claims are proven by evidence independent of Dr. 
Goldenring's testimony and are amenable to lay understanding. The trial court, therefore, 
erred by entering summary judgment. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is well established in the 
State of Utah. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). To 
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prevail, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acted (a) with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would 
result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable 
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 
Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 
UT App 126, t 21, citing Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961). 
(emphasis added). 
In Gulbraa, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of 
plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gulbraa, at fflf 24,25. There, 
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the church had conspired with federal fugitives, wanted on 
kidnaping charges, to conceal the whereabouts of his children and interfered with plaintiffs 
custodial and parental rights. Id., at f 20. The church defendants argued that the church's 
conduct could not be considered outrageous, sufficient to support plaintiffs claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at f 23. The court disagreed, holding that 
whether the conduct was outrageous and intolerable was a question of fact to be determined 
by the fact finder. Id. Whether the plaintiffs distress was "severe" was also a question for 
the fact finder." Id. 
Likewise, in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App 340, 143 P.3d 295, the court 
of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Sorensen, at fflf 24,25. There, Sorensen sustained serious back and head 
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injuries in an automobile accident and was treated by Barbuto, with diagnostic examinations, 
prescriptions for medicine, and cognitive therapy. Id., at f 2. Sorensen then filed a personal 
injury action against the driver that injured him. Id., at %3. During the action, Sorensen 
learned that Barbuto had engaged in ex parte communications with defense counsel, prepared 
a ten-page report for defense counsel's use, and agreed to testify as an expert witness for the 
defense. Id, Also, contrary to his earlier diagnosis, Barbuto asserted that psychological and 
social factors contributed to Sorensen's medical injuries. Id. 
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's finding that Barbuto's 
actions were, as a matter of law, not "extreme and outrageous." Id. at fflf 24,25. The court 
noted that "Barbuto not only communicated ex parte with defense counsel—Barbuto actually 
became a paid advocate for Sorensen's adversary". Id. The court concluded that "the 
conduct alleged here . . . meets the threshold necessary to maintain an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress." Id. 
As in Gulbraa and Sorensen, in the case at bar, the facts meet the threshold 
sufficient to maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In violation 
of the hospital rules, defendants' agents used plaintiff s critically-ill, medically-unstable son, 
without plaintiffs permission, to test a sales-model ventilator that they were considering for 
purchase. The sales model had never previously been attached to any patient, let alone a 
critically-ill, unstable patient. Defendants' agents did not even take it on a trial run. 
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Defendants' agent, Tammy Bleak, knew that she had not assessed the reliability 
of the sales model for patient use pursuant to the hospital's testing and evaluation 
requirements. Defendants' agents also knew that Derek was ventilator-dependent and would 
likely not be able to tolerate even a brief interruption in his ventilation. Defendants' agents 
took a big risk with Derek's life and he and his fathers were the losers of that risk. This is 
conduct "of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that [it] offend[s] 
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 
Also, a reasonable jury could conclude that Derek's father suffered severe 
emotional distress, and that any reasonable person would have known that severe emotional 
distress would result from losing on the risk that defendants took with Derek's life. Plaintiff 
was devastated by the death of his son, which was all the more painful given the recent loss 
of his wife. As the court can see from the photographic exhibits, plaintiff had a beautiful 
family, but due to defendant's conduct in using his son as a test subject for a sales model 
ventilator, he was left with no one. See photographs at R. 3166-67. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER 
Under Utah Law, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages against a defendant 
for "conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of 
the rights of others." Utah Code §70-18-l(l)(a). From the facts and conduct of defendants' 
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agents set forth above in POINT III, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant Primary 
Children's conduct manifests a knowing and reckless disregard for the safety of Derek 
Nguyen and the rights of plaintiff, his father. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in precluding plaintiffs medical expert, 
John Goldenring, M.D., from testifying at trial. Sufficient foundation was laid for Dr. 
Goldenring's testimony establishing standards of care applicable to the defendants, breaches 
of those standards, failure by defendants' agents to obtain informed consent, and causation 
of Derek Nguyen's death. The trial court also erred in entering summary judgment of 
plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and lack of informed consent because some of 
plaintiffs claims are established by evidence independent of Dr. Goldenring's testimony and 
are amenable to lay understanding. 
The trial court erroneously entered summary judgment of plaintiff s claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for punitive damages, because defendants' 
conduct in using Derek caused plaintiff severe emotional distress, was outrageous, is 
intolerable, and manifests a reckless disregard for the safety of Derek Nguyen and plaintiff s 
rights. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals 
reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court and remand the case for trial. 
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DATED AND SUBMITTED this 9th day of February, 2009. 
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